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Macroeconomic fluctuations have been less severe in the past thirty
years than in the period before World War II. Although the recessions
in the 1970s and 1980s have been large and have been associated with
big swings in inflation, the average amplitude of cyclical fluctuations
is still smaller than in the prewar period.
This improvement in macroeconomic performance was already ev-
ident to most economists by the end ofthe 1950s. It served as the focal
point ofArthur Bums's 1959 presidential address before the American
Economic Association. Bums contrasted the milder postwar fluctua-
tions with those he studied with Wesley Clair Mitchell at the National
Bureau of Economic Research. He attributed the improvement to
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy as well as to structural changes
in the economy: more stable corporate dividends, steadieremployment
practices, better inventory controls, and greater financial stability ow-
ing to deposit insurance.
The improvement in economic performance still deserves the atten-
tion ofmacroeconomists. An understanding ofthe reasons for the im-
provement is invaluable for recommending what changes in policy
sliould, or should not, be adopted. Moreover, at a time when macro-
economic research is undergoing difficult and fundamental changes,
the improvement servesas auseful reminderofthepracticalimportance
of continued progress in macrotheory and macroeconometrics. Re-
gardless of one's approach to macroeconomic research, one can, as
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James Tobin (1980) has urged, "take some encouragement from the
economic performance of the advanced democratic capitalist nations
since the Second World War."
This paper examines the role of wage and price rigidities in this
improvementin macroeconomic performance. Wage and price rigidities
are at the center of most modern economic theories of the business
cycle. According to these theories, if wages and prices were more
flexible the economy would experience shorterandless severebusiness
cycle fluctuations. Many economists have therefore suggested eco-
nomic reforms-such as synchronized wage and price setting-to make
wages and prices more flexible.
I examine changes in wage and price rigidities and in macroeconomic
performancebyconcentratingontwo episodesin United Stateshistory:
the quarter-century before World War I, from 1891 through 1914, and
the slightly longer period after World War II, from 1952 through 1983.
Eachperiodincludes eight economic fluctuations. By ending the earlier
period before World War I, we exclude the economic turbulence of
both world wars as well as the Great Depression of the 1930s. 1 Even
with these exclusions, economic fluctuations in the earlier period were
larger than those in the postwar period. The data also indicate that
wages and prices were more flexible in the earlier period. This latter
finding, which has also been noted by other researchers,2 presents a
puzzle. Less flexibility of wages and prices should lead to a deterio-
ration in economic performance. The comparison suggests that the
opposite has occurred. Either other factors-such as those mentioned
by Burns-were strong enough to offset the reduced wage/price flex-
ibility, or macrotheory needs some revision if it is to provide a satis-
factory explanation for economic fluctuations in both these periods of
United States history.
The research reported here makes use of some recently developed
econometric time series methodology. The differences in economic
fluctuations in the two periods are documented using simple reduced-
form vector autoregressions and their moving average representations.
1. The interwar period would also make a useful comparison. In the first draft ofthis
paper I looked at the period 1910-40. To omit the observations from World War1-
which would be analogous to the omissionofWorld WarII from the latersample-would
mean that the period could not begin until 1919 at the earliest; and since some observers
interpret the 1920 recession as a direct consequence of demobilization, the same logic
would call for starting in 1921 or 1922. The sample size would then be fewer than twenty
annual observations, which is already very small for statistical time series analysis. If
one worried further that the Great Depression was unique and should not be lumped
together with other cycles, then one would be left with the 1920s, a period far too short
for statistical analysis. For these reasons I decided to focus on the period before World
War I. This period has some other advantages as a contrast with the period 1952-83.
These are discussed in the next section.
2. See Cagan 1979, Gordon 1983, and Mitchell 1983, for example.641 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
These give the "facts without theory," nluch as the Burns/Mitchell
NBER reference cycle methods did. This reduced-form evidence is
then given an explicit structural interpretation in a simple mathematical
form. One advantage ofthis statistical approach overthe earlier NBER
methods is that it provides a tight and formal connection between
theory and the facts. The connection between theory and the facts
revealed through reference cycle charts is necessarily looser and less
formal, although these charts can be very useful in the early stages of
model development. The methodology uSt~d here to compare time pe-
riods by looking at both reduced forms and simple structural models
is similar to the method I used for an international comparison of
different countries (Taylor 1980, 1982).
11.1 A Simple Scorecard for Macroeconomic Performance
It is useful to begin with some simple but objective statistical mea-
sures of macroeconomic performance in the different periods. These
measures as well as all the statistical analysis in this paper are based
on annual data. Output is measured by real GNP, prices are measured
by the GNP deflator, and wages are based on average hourly earnings
in manufacturing.
The means and standard deviations ofthe three detrended series are
presented in table 11.1. To be specific, let Y be real GNP and let Y*
be potential GNP. Then detrended output given by y = (Y - Y*)/Y*,
and is referred to as the output gap in the figures and tables of the
paper. Potential GNP is assumed to be growing at a constant, but
different, exponential rate in each ofthe p(~riods. The level ofpotential
is chosen so that the average of y is zero in each period. Experimen-
tation with some alternative assumptions about the growth of Y* did
not affect the results by much. For example, when the trend in Y* was
permitted to change in 1973 to reflect th4~ slowdown in productivity


























Note: By definition the average output gap is zero. Prices are measured by the GNP
deflator and wages by average hourly earnings in manufacturing.642 John B. Taylor
growth in the United States, the results were similar. I chose to detrend
outputusing a deterministictrendratherthan first differences to capture
the tendency for output to return to its potential growth path after a
disturbance.
On the other hand, wages and prices were detrended by taking first
differences of the logarithms; that is, by looking at the rate of price
inflation (P) and the rate of wage inflation (w). In the postwar period
there is no tendency for the price level to return to a trend path after
a disturbance. At best, the rate ofinflation tends to regress to some
mean value; even this tendency was not present in the postwar data
before 1982-83. Although the United States was on a gold standard
during the period before World War I, the levels of prices and wages
show no tendency to regress to a fixed trend or level in that period
either, presumably because of changes in the world gold stock and in
the relative price ofgold.
The statistics reported in table 11.1 refer to the detrended series for
output y, wage inflation w, and price inflation p. According to the
standard deviation measure, output fluctuations have been about 25%
smaller in the period after World War II than in the quarter-century
before World War I. The improved outputperformance does not extend
to inflation, however. The standard deviation of the year-over-year
inflation rate is about the same in the two periods-up slightly for wage
inflation (w) and down slightly for price inflation (p). The average in-
flation rate is much higher in the postwar period by both measures of
inflation.
To provide some perspective, I have also included in column 3 of
table 11.1 the same performance measures for the period 1910-40,
which includes both World War I andthe GreatDepression. This period
is far worse than the other two by any of the performance measures.
Outputfluctuations are almost three times as large as in the post-World
War II period, and inflation fluctuations are about four times as large.
Only the average inflation rate is less in this period than in the postwar
period, but since the average is taken over very large positive values
and very large negative values, this is not a very meaningful perfor-
mance measure.
11.2 Output and Inflation Fluctuations
The statistics in table 11.1 are far from sufficient for characterizing
the dynamic behavior oftwo such serially and contemporaneously cor-
related variables as output and inflation. Time series charts for inflation
and output in the two periods are shown in the upper and lower panels
offigures 11.1 and 11.2. For additional perspective, the corresponding
charts for the 1910-40 time period are shown in the middle panels.643 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
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Fig 11.2 Price inflation and the deviation of real output from trend
during three periods.645 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
Note that the scales on the charts for the different time periods are
different. (The output gap y = (Y - Y*)/Y* is superimposed on both
the wage inflation charts and the price inllation charts.) Some of the
milder recessions in the earlier period are smoothed out by the use of
annual data. The severe recession that began early in 1893 and ended
in mid-1894 stands out as one of the worst of the period, as does the
brief but sharp recession that began with the financial panic in 1907.
The period ends with the 1914 recession before the beginning ofWorld
War I.
The charts clearly indicate that the tendency for inflation to fall in
recessions and rise in booms is not new. Inflation fell during all the
more severe downturns between 1891 and 1914. Inflation was negative
on average from 1891 to 1907 and positive on average from 1907 until
1914. During this latter subperiod the \vorld gold supply steadily
increased.
A comparison ofthe charts for the earlit~r period with the charts for
the laterperiod reveals in a rough way many ofthe differences between
the two periods that I will focus on. First, the amplitude of the fluc-
tuations in output is smaller in the postwar period, as we have already
observed. (Again note the difference in the scales on these figures.)
Second, the duration of the fluctuations in inflation is longer in the
postwar period; inflation has been much more "persistent." Stated
another way, wages and prices have developed more rigidities, in the
sense that past values ofwages and prices influence their current val-
ues. Much of the higher inflation persistence is due to the prolonged
period in the 1970s when the inflation rate was abnormally high before
it fell sharply in 1982 and 1983. In comparison, during the period before
World War I wage inflation fluctuated up and down much more rapidly.
Even the persistent negative trend in prices and wages before 1897 is
swamped by the fluctuations in the inflation rate; similarly, the positive
trend after 1897 is hidden by the larger fluctuations around the trend.
The third important difference between the two periods is in the du-
ration of the fluctuations of real output. .As with inflation, these are
longer since World War II.
The fourth important difference between the two periods is more
difficult to see in the charts but is somew·hat more evident in figures
11.3 and 11.4. It relates to the timing of the fluctuations of inflation
and output. In the postwar period, there: is a marked tendency for
increases in inflation to bring about a downturn in the economy, al-
though with a lag. After the downturn inflation begins to fall. For
example, an increase in inflation in the late 1960s preceded the down-
turn in the economy in 1969-70. Afterthe downturn, inflation declined.
Similarly, an increase in inflation in 1973--74 preceded the downturn



















Fig. 11.3 Movingaverage representationfor price inflation and output.
in inflation in 1979-80 preceded the back-to-back recessions in 1980-
82. And as usual, inflation then fell. It is very difficult to detect similar
patterns in the period 1891-1914. Increases in inflation do not seem to
lead the economic downturns, and the declines in inflation seem to
occur simultaneously with the declines in the real ecanomy. Although
this timing difference can be pried out ofthe charts, it emerges much
more easily in the statistical time series analysis ofthe nexttwo sections.
The middle panels in figures 11.1 and 11.2 clearly indicate that the
amplitude of the fluctuations is much larger in 1910-40 than in either
the period before or the period after. The effect of World War I is












Fig. 11.4 Movingaverage representationfor wage inflation and output.
extended boom in the 1920s and the Great Depression dominate the
charts. The wide fluctuations in wages and prices indicate the same
type offlexibility that is evident before World War I. The persistence
ofwage and price inflation-a sign ofwage and price rigidities used in
macrotheory-definitely seems relatively nc~w.
11.3 Vector Autoregressions
Thedynamic propertiesofoutput, wages, andpricescanbeexamined
more systematically by estimating unconstrained vector autoregres-
sions. Estimates ofbivariate autoregressions for wage inflation and out-648 John B. Taylor
put,andforpriceinflationandoutput,arereportedintables 11.2and 11.3
for both 1893-1914and 1954-83. Thelag lengthis equalto two yearsfor
all the regressions. For annual data this choice oflag length seemed to
eliminate mostofthe serial correlation ofthe residuals to the equations.
Higher-order systems with both wage inflation and price inflation to-
getherwith outputwere also estimatedbutare notreported here. Atthis
levelofaggregation the movements ofwages andpricesare very similar,
so that including a third variable does not add much to the analysis.
These autoregressions are not necessarily structural equations. They
are reduced-form equations that in principle can be derived from a
variety of systems of structural equations. The lag coefficients in the
autoregressions are in principle functions ofparameters in all the struc-
tural equations. The shocks to each of the autoregression equations
are in principle functions of the shocks to all the structural equations
and depend on simultaneity parameters in the structural equations. In
this section my aim is simply to describe the autoregressions rather
than to give them a structural interpretation.
A quick glance at tables 11.2 and 11.3 reveals that the structure of
the autoregressions differs by a large amount in the two periods. Both
the structure ofthe shocks to the equations (the impulses) and the lag
coefficients (the propagation mechanism) are much different.




.721 .084 .257 -.027 -.09 1.03 .82
(3.5) (0.4) (2.7) (-0.3)
-1.05 .76 1.00 -.004 -0.5 2.07 .66
(-2.6) (2.0) (5.2) (-0.0)
Contemporaneous correlation between residuals = .23
Note: Each equation was estimated with a constant term. The variable p is the annual
percentage rate ofchange in the GNP deflator. The variable y is the percentage deviation
ofoutputfrom lineartrendestimatedoverthe sampleperiod. The numbers in parentheses
are t-ratios; p is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient; 0" is the standard error ofthe
residuals.649 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability




Variable w(-1) w(-2) y(-1) y(-2) p cr R2
Sample Period 1893-1914
w 0.52 .007 .147 - .213 .02 1.66 .30
(0.2) (0.1) (1.3) (-1.8)
y -.358 -0.30 .220 -.063 .05 4.49 .04
(-0.6) (-0.1) (0.7) (-0.2)




.569 .175 .097 .103 -.03 1.20 .70
(2.5) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8)
-.650 .336 1.026 - .181 .04 2.21 .62
(-1.6) (0.8) (4.5) (-0.8)
Contemporaneous correlation between residuals = .52
Note: The variable w is the annual percentage rate ofchange in average hourly earnings
in manufacturing. For the definition of other variables see the note to table 11.2.
11.3.1 The Impulses
The variance ofthe shocks, or the impulses, to the output equation
has decreased sharply from the prewar to the postwar period. To the
extent that macroeconomic policy works by changing the dynamics of
the economy-as it would with feedback policy, the finding that a
reduction in the size of the shocks explains most of the reduced vari-
ability suggests that such feedback policy ,vas not responsible for im-
provements in performance. However, part of the change in policy
could affect the variance ofthe shocks by working''within the period"
to offset exogenous disturbances. This would be more likely for the
automatic stabilizers that react simultaneously, but with annual data
even a feedback policy that reacts to econoInic disturbances within the
year would affect the variance ofthe shocks rather than the dynamics
of the system.
The variance of the shocks to the inflation equations is also much
smaller in the postwar period. Since the overall variance ofinflation is
about the same in the two periods, changes in the propagation mech-
anism must have had a positive influence on the variance of inflation.
The impulses have become weaker. It is perhaps surprising that the
variance of the shocks to inflation has become smaller. According to
these estimates, an increased importance of price shocks in postwar
business cycles is not supportedby a comparisonwith the period before
World War I.650 John B. Taylor
The contemporaneous correlation between the shocks to the equa-
tions is positive in both the prewar and the postwar periods. However,
the correlation is stronger in the prewar period. More of the action
seems tocome within the annual time intervalduring the prewarperiod.
11.3.2 The Propagation Mechanism
The sum ofthe coefficients ofthe lagged inflation rates in the inflation
equations is much smaller in the earlier period. This change is more
marked for wage inflation than for price inflation. This change is con-
sistent with the increased persistence ofinflation in the postwarperiod
that is evident in the time series charts. The sum ofthe coefficients on
lagged outputin theoutputequationis also higherin thepostwarperiod,
reflecting a corresponding increase in the persistence of output fluc-
tuations.
The difference in the temporal ordering ofinflation and output move-
ments that seems to emerge from the time series plots is evident in the
cross, oroff-diagonal, autoregression coefficients. In the prewarperiod
lagged inflation has eithera positive oran insignificant effect on output.
In the postwar period the effect oflagged inflation on output is signif-
icantly negative. Lookingatthe otherside ofthe diagonal, in the prewar
period lagged output has a negative effect on inflation; in the postwar
period it has a positive effect.
11.4 Moving Average Representations
The moving average representations provide a more convenient way
to look at the propagation mechanisms in the economy. They can be
derived directly from the autoregression equations. The vector auto-
regressions reported in tables 11.2 and 11.3 can be written in matrix
notation as follows:
(1)
where Zt = (wt,Yt), in the systems with wage inflation and output, and
where Zt = (Pt,Yt), in the systems with price inflation and output. Al
and A 2 are two-by-two matrixes of lag coefficients. The two-by-one
vector et is supposed to be serially uncorrelated. The moving average
representation is then given by
(2)
where the 8 1 matrixes are found by successive substitution oflagged
zs in equation (1). Alternatively, and perhaps more intuitively, the 8
matrixes canbe computed by dynamically simulating the effects ofunit
shocks to each of the equations in (1). The two elements of the first
columnof8 1aregivenbytheeffectsofaunitinflation shockoninflation651 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
and output, respectively, in this simulation. The two elements of the
second column of 8 1 are given by the effects of a unit output shock
on inflation and output, respectively, in the simulation.































Note: Derived from the autoregression coeflicients reported in table 11.2.


























































































Note: Derived from the autoregression coefficients reported in table 11.3.































































Note: Derived from the autoregression coefficients reported in table 11.3.
The use ofmoving average representations in macroeconomics orig-
inates with the influential paper by Sims (1980) in which he refers to it
as innovationaccounting; theapproachhas sincebeenadoptedbymany
otherresearchers. There are many moving average representations ofa
given multivariate process depending on what one assumes about the
contemporaneous correlation between the shocks. Sims suggests that a
form bechosensothatthe covariancematrixofthe shocksis diagonal-
anorthogonalizationofthe shocks. This requires a transformationofthe
8 i matrixes. The transformation is a function of the correlation ofthe
shocks and depends on how one wishes to order the way the shocks
enter the system. The methodology used here is different from that of
Sims in that the 8 i matrixes have not been transformed to yield orthog-653 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
onal shocks. I have found that such a transformation makes it difficult
to give a direct structural economic interpretation of the 8 j matrixes.
The method used here was also used for very similar purposes in an
international comparison ofeconomic performance (Taylor 1980).
Figures 11.3 and 11.4 indicate the enormousness of the change that
has taken place in the dynamics ofinflation and output since the period
before World War I. The charts on the diagonal offigures 11.3 and 11.4
show the persistence ofinflation 8pp and output 8yy• Both have increased.
The cross effect of the shocks has changed even more. The 6py
coefficients have changed sign; an output shock has a long-delayed
effect on inflation in the more recent period. Before World War I this
dynamic effect was very small. Recall, however, that a positive con-
temporaneous relation between output and inflation existed before World
War I. The 6yp coefficients have changed in the reverse direction.
Whereas inflation shocks generated a reduction in output iIi the more
recent period, they generated an increase in output before World War
I. This change, which emerges so clearly from the moving average
representations, is the same change that was barely visible in the time
series charts: when inflation rises in the r(~cent period, output falls;
inflation then subsequently subsides.
11.5 Summary of the Facts
The preceding examination of the facts of inflation and output fluc-
tuations in 1891-1914 (the first period) and 1952-83 (the second period)
can be summarized as follows:
1. Output fluctuations are smaller in amplitude and more persistent
in the second period.
2. Inflation fluctuations are about the same in amplitude in both
periods but are more persistent in the second.
3. Inflation shocks have a negative, but lagged, effect on output in
the second period; output shocks have a positive, but lagged effect on
inflation in the second period. No such timing relation exists in the first
period. If there is any intertemporal effect in the first period, it is in
the reverse direction.
4. There is a positive contemporaneous correlation between the in-
flation shocks and the output shocks in both periods. This correlation
is larger in the first period.
5. The variances ofthe shocks to inflation and to output are smaller
in the later period.
11.6 Structural Interpretations
The vector autoregression can be viewed as a reduced form of a
structural model. Unfortunately the mapping from the reduced form654 John B. Taylor
to the structural form is not one-to-one. The traditional identification
literature shows formally that there will in principle be many structural
models that are consistent with a given reduced form. In practice,
however, the situation is not so dismal. There are a relatively small
number of theoretically sound or "reasonable" structural models.
Moreover, the properties ofan estimated reduced form can frequently
narrow the range ofpossible structural models.
11.6.1 The Postwar Period
The third property ofthe estimated autoregressions listed at the end
of the previous section is very useful for nailing down a reasonable
structural model. The dynamic interactionbetween inflation and output
in the postwarperiod is very strong. Inflation "Grangercauses" output
in a negative direction; and output "Granger causes" inflation in a
positive direction. This pattern naturally leads to the following inter-
pretation for the postwar period.
The Federal Reserve, or the "aggregate demand authorities" in gen-
eral, is concerned with stabilizing inflation as well as unemployment.
For aggregate demand shocks thisjoint aim causes no conflict; the best
policy for both price and output stabilization is to offset the shocks.
When an inflation shock comes, however, there is a conflict. The Fed
must decide how "accommodative" to be. On average during the post-
war period the Fed seems to have made a compromise. Policy is de-
scribedbya policyrule. Whenaninflation shockoccurs, the Fedneither
fully "accommodates" the shock by increasing the rate of growth of
the money supply point for point with inflation nor tries to eliminate
it immediately by sharply reducing money growth. Instead, it lets money
growth increase, but by less than the inflation shock. The result is the
dynamic patternobservedin the vectorautoregressions. When inflation
increases the Fed lets real money balances-appropriately defined-
fall, and the economy slips into a recession. Hence, inflation "Granger
causes" output. The slack demand conditions then gradually work to
reduce inflation. Hence, output "Granger causes" inflation.
This structural interpretation is by no means new, and it is gradually
being incorporated in standard textbooks. For the data used here the
following simple algebraic structural model seems to match the reduced
form very well:
(3)
(4) Yt = -~tPt-l + ~2Pt-2 + Yt-l + Vt·
The notation for output Yt and inflation Pt is the same as earlier. The
operator E is the conditional expectation based on information through
period t - 1. The shocks Ut and Vt areassumedtobeseriallyuncorrelated.655 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
The first equation is a simple price adjustment equation. This equa-
tion has no simulaneous effects between output and inflation. The sec-
ond equation is the policy rule described above. It states that the rate
of growth of output relative to trend is reduced if inflation has risen.
If this system is to match up with the reduced-form evidence, the
parameters should all be positive.
The estimated equations (written with the constants explicit and the
t-ratios in parentheses) are:
(J" = 1.0, R2 = .83 (5) Pt = .89pt-l + .25EYt + .55 ,
(10.1) (3.6) (1.3)
(6) Yt = -1.Olpt_l + .69pt-2 +Yt-l + 1.17, (J" = 2.0, R2 = .67
(- 3.5) (2.5) (1.6)
These equations were estimated using the full information maximum
likelihood method. This method takes account of the cross-equation
restrictions that occur when the second equation is used to forecast
output in the first equation. The output equation is already in re-
duced form and is clearly not much different from the estimated
equation in table 11.2. The reduced form for inflation can easily be
derived by substituting the expectation of equation (6) into equation
(5). It also matches up well with the reduced-form equation in
table 11.2.
Equation (6) indicates that there is much less accommodation of
inflation in the short run than in the long run. The short-run reaction
coefficient is about -I, whereas the long-run reaction is about - 0.3.
Equation (5) indicates that inflation responds to slack demand with a
lag. 3 The coefficient on lagged inflation depends on the structure of
contracts in the economy as well as on expectations of inflation; the
parameter would change with a change in the policy rule that changed
expectations, and in this sense it is incorrect to refer to the equation
as structural.
The policy rule can be written in the following interesting form:
(7) Yt - Yt-l = - .32pt-l - .69(pt-l - Pt-2) + 1.17.
In other words, the rate ofgrowth ofreal GNP (relative to potential)
is reduced by 32% of the inflation rate in the last period plus 69% of
the changeofthe inflation rate. The response ofthe Fedto high inflation
is stronger when inflation is increasing than when it is decreasing. A
3. The data cannot discriminate between the assumptions that Yt or Et appears in
equation (5). The contemporaneous correlation is positive and could equally well be due
to the correlation between the structural shocks as to a direct simultaneous effect ofYt
on Pt.656 John B. Taylor
nominal GNPrule could be interpreted4 as having an implied coefficient
- 1 on the lagged inflation rate, with no adjustment for increasing or
decreasing inflation. The estimated rule is less accommodative than a
nominal GNP rule in the short run and more accommodative than a
nominal GNP rule in the long run.
11.6.2 The Prewar Period
This model of price adjustment and policy is explicitly oriented to
the postwar period in the United States. The wide differences between
the autoregressions in the prewar and the postwar periods indicate
that the same model is unlikely to fit in the prewar period. In fact,
the model does very poorly in the prewar period. The coefficient on
lagged inflation in the inflation equation (3) is negative though small
and insignificant, whereas the coefficients on lagged prices in the
output equation (4) are all positive. As the reduced-form results sug-
gested, the dynamic relation between inflation and output in the pre-
war period is weak and opposite in sign from that for the postwar
period.
The price adjustment equation without the insignificant lagged infla-
tion rate is
(8) Pt = .28Yt + 1.33.
(2.5) (2.0)
Hence, although the lagged inflation rate disappears, the adjustment
coefficient is about the same size as before.
There are two possible implications of this failure of the postwar
model.5 First, prices and wages appearto be moreflexible in the prewar
periodin thattheircorrelationwithoutputfluctuations is almostentirely
contemporaneous. Adjustments occur within the annual time interval,
unlike the postwar period, where the adjustments are drawn out for
several years. Second, macroeconomic policy appears to be very ac-
commodative; inflation shocks seemed to have no prior negative effect
on output. Are these implications plausible?
11.6.3 More Flexible Wages and Prices?
The reduced importance ofthe lagged inflation term could be due
to simple expectations effects as well as to changes in the structure of
4. Taken literally, a nominal GNP rule would respond to inflation shocks in the current
period. In practice, however, a lag would probably occur.
5. It should be noted that there are fairly strong dynamic feedback effects from output
and prices two years earlier in the price inflation system (see table 11.2). This is puzzling
since the impact from prices and output one year earlier is weak. This two-year leap is
the reason for the sawtooth moving average representation for this system (see fig. 11.3).657 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
wage and price setting. The inertia effect in the postwar period is a
combination of expectations effects and stIucture. Since inflationary
expectations were probably much lowerin the prewarperiod, the effect
of lagged inflation would be smaller. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
distinguish these two effects with aggregate data.
The problemhas been addressed by Cagan (1979) and Mitchell (1983)
using microeconomic data. Although neitherauthorlooksatdatabefore
World War I, their findings are probably relevant for the comparison
ofthis paper. Cagan compares price movemc~nts in the business cycles
of the 1920s with price movements in the business cycles after World
War II. Mitchell compares wage adjustments in the 1930s with wage
adjustments in the postwar period. Both find that price and wage ad-
justments were larger and more frequent in the earlier period. From a
microeconomic perspective wages and prict~s were more flexible.
Two possible reasons for this change have been noted. First, the
increased importance of large business enterprises and large unions
could have centralized price and wage decisions and made them less
subject to short-run market pressures. In the major labor unions, for
example, the costs ofnegotiating a large settlement made it economical
to have long three-year contracts in many industries. The overlapping
nature of these contracts added to the persistence of wage trends.
Second, economic policy changed so as to reduce the severity ofreces-
sions and thereby lessen the need to reduce wages and prices quickly
in the face of slack demand conditions. This policy effect is different
from the expectation ofinflation effect mentioned above.
11.6.4 More Accommodative Policy?
Although the United States Treasury took on some central bank
functions in the early 1900s, during most ofthe period 1891-1914 mon-
etary policy was determined solely by the lfnited States commitment
to the gold standard. A gold standard is normally thought to generate
aggregate demand "discipline." Policy would automatically be non-
accommodative. For example, if there was an inflation shock, then a
contractionary policy would be necessary in order to bring the price
level back to its relative position with gold. Then why do the data
suggest the opposite, that policy was accommodative?
One explanation comes from the fact that the United States was a
small open economy during this period. Most price shocks probably
came from abroad, much as the price shocks in the 1970s came from
abroad. An increase in external prices with a fixed exchange rate will
make domestically produced goods cheaper. 'This will lead to a balance
of payments surplus until internal prices rise. A balance of payments
surplus increases the money supply for a country on a gold standard.658 John B. Taylor
The increase in the money supply will therefore tend to occurjust as
the domestic price level rises in response to the rise in world prices.
Policy will look very accommodative.
A fixed exchange rate gold standard will be less accommodative to
price shocks that originate at home. A price shock will raise domestic
prices relative to external prices. The resulting balance of payments
deficit will reduce the domestic money supply, and the economy will
tend to fall into a recession. Internal prices will then fall. Either this
type ofscenario did not occur in 1891-1914, or it occurred so quickly
that the timing cannot be detected with aggregate annual data. It is
interesting that accommodation under a gold standard seems to be
different for external shocks and internal shocks. According to modern
expectations theories this discrimination is appropriate. Internal en-
dogenous price and wage shocks are discouraged, whereas external
exogenous price shocks are accommodated. Because the externalprice
and wage behavior is unlikely to be influenced by the monetary policy
in a small open economy, accommodation will not do any long-run
harm. But internal price and wage behavior is likely to be adversely
affected by an accommodative policy.
Another way to describe the prewar policy rule is to say that it was
accommodative in the short run, permitting much slippage to accom-
modate external price shocks, but nonaccommodative in the long run.
Prices in the United States could not differ from world prices in the
long run. This is in contrast to the characterization in the previous
section ofpolicy in the postwar period: in the short run policy is much
less accommodative than in the long run.
To summarize, the interpretationthatprices andwages adjustquickly
and that policy is very accommodative in the short run is plausible
from a microeconomic perspective. Unlike the postwar period, where
lags in the relationbetweenoutputandinflationpermittedonetonarrow
down the field ofpotential models, for the prewarperiod dataare more
ambiguous. If all the action occurs within the annual timing interval,
it is difficult to distinguish one structural model from another. The lags
are not long enough to identify the structure. In fact, the contempor-
aneous relation between prices and output in equation (8) could have
been generated from a mechanism like the Lucas (1972) supply curve.
Ifprices were as flexible as they appear to be during this earlier period,
then the Lucas model itself is more plausible.
11.7 Concluding Remarks
Macroeconomic performance in the United Statesfrom 1891 through
1914 was much different from the performance after World War II. This
difference is apparent in reduced-form autoregressions, in theirmoving659 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
average representations, in simple structuralmodels, and evenin simple
time series charts ofthe data. The shocks, orimpulses, to the economic
system were smallerin the second period, mainly because ofthe policy
and structural changes that Arthur Burns lnentioned in his 1959 pres-
idential address. Deposit insurance, for example, reduced the shocks
to aggregate demand that came from financial panics.
But the dynamics, or propagation mechanisms, of the economic
system are much slower and more drawn out in the postwar period.
This tends to translate the smaller shocks into larger and more pro-
longed movements in output and inflation than would occur ifthe pre-
war dynamics were applicable in the later period. In other words, the
change in the dynamics of the system offset some of the gains from
the smallerimpulses. These postwardynamics canbe given a structural
interpretationin terms ofthe accommodative stanceofmonetary policy
and the speed of wage and price adjustments. These dynamics were
not evident in the prewar period.
One interpretation of these developments is that the change in the
dynamics was a direct result ofthe reduction in the importance ofthe
shocks. For example, prices and wages may have became more rigid
because of the reduced risks of serious reeessions or because move-
ments in the money supply began to do some of the macroeconomic
stabilization work that was previously done: by wage and price adjust-
ments. The analysis of this paper is not conclusive on this or on the
other interpretation that the change in the dynamics was unrelated to
the change in policy. But the possibility that a combination of the
smaller postwar shocks with the shorter prewar dynamics might im-
prove macroeconomic performance should be sufficient motivation for
further study of these historical developments and their alternative
interpretations.
Comment Phillip Cagan
It has long been noted that prices fluctuate less in post-World War II
business cycles than they used to, though with the higher rates of
inflation in the 1970s the amplitude offluctuations became larger. One
reason was that business cycles were generally less severe in the post-
war period; none matched the severity of 1929-33, 1937-38, 1920-21,
or 1907. Yet even for cycles of comparablt:~ severity in terms of real
variables the postwar period appeared to exhibit less price fluctuation.
It was generally agreed that prices and wages had become less flexible.
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In Taylor's annual data, these differences between periods are less
clear. Comparedwith the interwarcycles 1910-40, the post-World War
II period shows a standard deviation only one-quarter of the earlier
value for price inflation and one-third of the earlier value for wage
inflation. But compared with the pre-World War I cycles 1891-1914,
the post-World War II cycles had about the same standarddeviations-
only 8% smaller for price inflation and actually 16% larger for wage
inflation, even though the standard deviation ofreal GNPfrom its trend
was 25% smaller in the post-World War II period. Inflation rates in this
later period had a greater upward trend until the past few years, how-
ever, so that their standard deviations, if measured from trend, would
be smaller.
The smaller variation in inflation in the later period becomes clear
in the vector autoregression analysis of price and wage inflation and
the real GNPgap. The residuals from these regressions represent unex-
plainedmovements, whichTaylorinterprets as "shocks" tothe system.
These shocks are much smaller in the postwar period. Compared with
the pre-World War I period, in the postwar period shocks are reduced
by 50% for prices and for the output gap and by 25% for wages.
Taylor uses this comparison of shocks to explain why, if prices and
wages are less flexible in the postwar period, the output gap at the
same time shows less rather than more variability. The answer is that
shocks in the postwarperiod were sufficiently smaller to overcome the
tendency of cyclical fluctuations to show up more in output than in
prices and wages.
What are these shocks? Some are supply shocks, best illustrated by
the OPEC oil price increases of1973 and 1979 orby majorlabor strikes,
as in steel in 1953 and automobiles in 1971, but for the most part these
are fairly rare events. Shocks can also appear on the demand side, as
in the financial panics of 1893 and 1907, which produced sudden con-
tractions in the available money supply. In addition, we should rec-
ognize the possibility ofmundane but ubiquitous measurement errors,
particularlyin the earlierperiodwhen the dataare clearly less accurate.
When Simon Kuznets put together his annual GNP data for the pre-
1929 period, he was so concerned with the imprecision ofthe estimates
that he was unwilling to publish the annual figures and planned to
release only five-year averages. He was subsequently persuaded, I
understand, to allow Friedman and Schwartz to use the data in annual
form, since the five-year averages would have been useless for cyclical
analysis. Kuznets obviously knew something about these data that the
rest ofus should not ignore. The GNP series from Historical Statistics
that Taylor used are not much better.
Finally, Taylor's shocks may reflect variations over time in cyclical
relationships that cannot be captured by a small number ofautoregres-661 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
sion lag terms. Cycles vary in duration and amplitude, and such vari-
ations may reflect the internal dynamics ofthe cyclical process as well
as different dynamics depending on the type of shock, particularly
whether it is viewed as temporary or permanent. I cannot refrain here
from expressing my uneasiness with the spreading popularity ofvector
autoregression analysis. My concern is not with its atheoretical ap-
proach, which bothers some critics-that can often be an advantage-
but with the fact that relatively simple autoregression and moving av-
erage representations do not fit many tirne series adequately, even
though the residuals may pass tests as white noise. In work that I have
done, an ARIMA fit to Ml growth produces residuals that have a much
smaller variance in the 1960s than in the 1950s and 1970s. There is no
simple way to model this pronounced change in variance. I also found
that GNP growth in the 1970s cannot be represented by ARIMA func-
tions that fit earlier periods. (Ofcourse, structural econometric models
may face the same problem of inadequate fit over different periods.)
The NBER used to have a tradition ofpresenting charts ofbasic data.
I would be less uneasy ifthe users ofvector autoregressions pondered
charts of their fits and showed them to the reader.
Having raised these red warning flags, I do not wish to dismiss all
such statistical analyses. In many cases, and in Taylor's analysis of
prices and wages, I find the vector autore:gressions a useful and en-
lightening supplement to other modes ofanalysis.
His autoregressions contain three other pieces ofinformation in ad-
dition to the variance ofthe residuals. The first is the contemporaneous
correlation of residuals in the paired regressions. These are about the
same for the pre-World War I and post-World War II periods but twice
as large in the wage as in the price regressions. Although Taylor does
not commenton this information, I interpretit as some evidence against
greater measurement error in the earlier period. The shocks should be
correlated, since most demand and supply shocks will affect prices and
wages as well as output in the span of one year. Measurement error
would normally be uncorrelated and thus would produce no correlation
of residuals.
Another more important piece ofinformation provided by the vector
autoregressions is the coefficients on lagged values of the dependent
variables. These are a measure of persiste~nce-thedegree to which
the series is a continuation of its previous values. Based on the size
and statistical significance of these coeffic:ients, the postwar period
shows much more persistence, as we knew it would from previous
studies ofthe flexibility ofprices and wages. Taylor's measure ofper-
sistence nicely summarizes this development. The patternofincreasing
persistence is broken, however, by a large significant coefficient in the
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which is positive and characteristic of"sawtooth" movements, has no
obvious interpretation. A feedback mechanism such as existed under
the gold standard would produce a negative coefficient. It appears to
be a fluke and lends support to the importance ofmeasurement error.
The cross-coefficients in these regressions, those showing the effect
ofprice and wage inflation on output, canbeinterpretedas the response
ofthe monetary system to inflationary pressures. Positive coefficients
indicateaccommodation, zerocoefficients noaccommodation, andneg-
ative coefficients a counter response. Here I am surprised by the re-
sults, and apparently Taylor was also. In the postwar period these
coefficients ofprices and wages in the output regressions are negative
for the first lag and positive for the second. This has the interesting
interpretation that policy since World War II has initially opposed in-
flationary pressures but then accommodated them, possibly as a re-
action to the consequences ofthe initial anti-inflationary actions or in
any event as an inability or unwillingness to carry through with them.
Although I am surprised to find this in the autoregressions, it is not
implausible. The time series pattern ofinflation since World War II can
be viewed as supporting this interpretation: inflationary movements
have fluctuated but overall have tended to rise from cycle to cycle,
except (let us hope!) for the most recent episode, 1979-83.
The indicated degree of such accommodation in the pre-World War
I period is quite different. The response to wage inflation is weakly
negative in the first lag and then zero in the second, indicating either
a partial accommodation over the two years or perhaps an immediate
strong opposition to inflation that is completed within one year and so
is absent from the first lagged year. For price inflation, however, the
response in the pre-World War I period is surprisingly positive, and it
is significantly positive in the second lagged year. This implies that
price movements were more fully accommodated under the gold stan-
dard than later under the Federal Reserve System. This may at first
seem counterintuitive, but I believe it correctly depicts the dynamics
of the gold standard. The vaunted monetary discipline of the gold
standard occurred only in the long run. The gold standard took two to
three cycles or more to reverse monetary and price developments if
they were moderate and not severely out of line with world trends,
and it was quite loose in the short run. I and others have pointed out
that United States gold specie flows were much smaller than cyclical
movements in the foreign trade balance. Most of the cyclical trade
imbalances were financed by capital flows, probably because ofa gen-
eral expectation thatgold would remain convertible ata fixed exchange
rate. The distribution of growing world gold stocks to maintain fixed
exchange rates worked slowly over long periods, except when con-
vertibility was threatened, such as by financial panics orby the United663 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
States silver purchase legislation ofthe early 1890s. The managed mon-
etary regime under the Federal Reserve System, on the other hand,
could and usually did act more quickly at first to counter inflationary
pressures, but since World War II, unfortunately, inadequately.
The vectorautoregression technique allows a description ofthe path
of the variables when a shock to one of the variables occurs. Taylor
shows the paths ofthe variables for the two periods in his figures 11.3
and 11.4 where the contemporaneous cOITelation between the error
terms has been ignored. He suggests that the two periods are best
represented by two quite different model interpretations. For the later
period he postulates that changes in output depend on the one-year
lagged inflation rate and the change in the inflation rate between the
two previous years. This is consistent with the results reported for the
autoregression equation. It is intended to represent a one-year lagged
effect ofmonetary policy on output. When fit to the data, this equation
suggests thatpolicy actions reduce outputby 30% ofthe previous year's
inflation rate and by 70% of the change in the inflation rate in the
previous year. This differs from a straightforward rule ofkeeping nom-
inal GNP constant, by which the coefficient for the inflation rate in this
equation on a one-year lag would be - 1. The fitted equation for the
later period thus differs from the GNP rule in that the response is well
under unity, and stronger if inflation is increasing than ifdecreasing.
In the other equation for the later period, price inflation is made
dependentonthe one-yearlagged inflation rate and the expectedoutput
gap. This expectation is based on the output equation. The assumption
that expected ratherthan actual output belongs in this equation follows
the literature on rational expectations and staggered contracts. Price
inflation is persistentbecause ofcontracts but partially responds in any
year to expected demand, here represented by expected output.
This model for the later period is an interesting and ingenious inter-
pretation of the empirical results. It is useful for comparison with the
earlier period. My main difficulty is with its extreme abstraction from
the details ofthe business cycle. Monetarypolicy is assumedto respond
only to inflation and not to output or other variables, and all the con-
tributions to the business cycle other than policy and price responses
are subsumed in the error terms. It is anyone's guess whether the
cyclical process that is approximated by this high degree ofabstraction
is valid or misleading.
In comparing the later with the earlier period, what in summary can
be said? Firstofall, prices in the laterperiod lost much ofthe flexibility
they displayed earlier. Unions and longer '''age contracts are a major
reason. But I believe the later inflexibility reflects more than this:
adjustments have become less flexible on a broader scale than can be
attributed to union contracts or their influence on costs. Taylor men-664 John B. Taylor
tions the growth of large business enterprises centralizing price deci-
sions, but inflexibility is just as true offabricated products supplied by
many small firms. The only broad effect that Taylor or anyone else,
including me, has been able to identify that stands up is the lessened
severity of cyclical fluctuations since World War II and presumably a
general expectation that government policies will oppose severe price
movements, thus reducing the likelihood that major price or wage
changes will have to be made. This shows up in the time series as
autocorrelation and greater persistence.
The second conclusion is that in the short run the monetary system
did not accommodate price movements in the later period but did so
in the earlier period. Taylor suggests that the earlier period reflected
the difference between external and internal price shocks. Under the
gold standard external price increases from abroad produced trade
surpluses and gold inflows along with direct price increases and thus
appearedto accommodate theprice shock. On the otherhand, domestic
price increases not matched abroad led to gold outflows and a subse-
quent contraction. The effect of internal price shocks in the earlier
period either occurred very quickly and so was invisible in the annual
dataorwas dominated by the external shocks. The latteris conceivable,
but there is no particular reason to believe that external shocks dom-
inated. Although the United States was somewhat like a small open
economy in this period and so ~as subject to influences from abroad,
it also generated majorinternal shocks such as harvest surpluses, bank-
ing panics, and the silver agitation.
In any event, I favor Taylor's other explanation, which in my inter-
pretation is to view the gold standard as accommodative in the short
run through variations in the gold reserve and as disciplined to be
nonaccommodative only in the long run to maintain convertibility.
Finally, although shocks were smaller in the later period, the dy-
namics of the system translated the shocks into larger and more pro-
longed movements in output and inflation. The change in dynamics
from the earlier to the later period would have produced larger cycles
in the later period had the shocks not become smaller.
The lack ofconclusiveness ofthe results here is due to the undefined
character of the shocks. Taylor alludes to stabilizing developments
listed by Arthur Burns in his 1959 presidential address, which included
deposit insurance to prevent panics, less fluctuation in dividend pay-
ments, automatic fiscal stabilizers, and so on. Most ofthese are "shocks"
only in the sense that they are not directly specified in Taylor's vector
autoregression. Moreover, they may not have been independent ofthe
dynamics. As Taylor suggests, price adjustments may have become
slower in response to these other developments that reduced the am-
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The interpretation ofthese developments I like is that policy became
more responsive to output gaps in the laterperiod and that this allowed
prices and wages to become less responsive. The effect was both to
reduce cyclical fluctuations and to accolnmodate a gradually rising
inflation rate. At first sight the autoregressions appear to contradict
this explanation, which implies that the output gap in the later period
should have a negative coefficient on its lagged value when in fact it
has a positive value. However, the negative coefficient may occur only
for contractions in output, not expansions, if policy has been asym-
metrical. The vector autoregressions miss such a distinction.
Taylor's analysis forces us to grapple with an apparent change in the
degree of accommodation between the earlier and later periods and a
reduction in the amplitude of shocks. I find these results generally
plausible. My main reservation is that the: shocks may be misleading
if their large size in the earlier period re:flects an inadequacy of the
price and output lags for explaining the dt~pendent variables. It might
be that a structural representation of both periods would yield exog-
enous shocks of equal amplitude. A comparison of these periods will
remain incomplete until we can empirically demonstrate whetherstruc-
tural changes or a decline in shocks account for the reduction in am-
plitude ofcycles. But my best guess is that mild cycles in both periods
were similar in dynamics and shocks and that the periods differ overall
because ofselected "severe" cycles owing to monetary disturbances,
which were a special breed prevalent before World War II.
Comment Stephen R. King
John Taylor has written an elegant paperon interpreting the differences
in the cyclical behavior ofoutput and inflation between the eight busi-
ness cycles that preceded World War I and the eight that followed the
World War II. The central difference he idt~ntifies between the periods
is thatthe postwarfluctuations in inflation and detrendedoutputdisplay
lower variance, but higher persistence, than those before World War
I. In fact, the mean peak-to-peak period ofthe postwar output cycles
is 4.2 years, tenmonths longerthan in theprewarperiod.! To distinguish
the impulses that initiate cycles from the propagation mechanism that
extends them, he examines innovations, orshocks to the system, which
Stephen R. King is assistant professor ofeconomic:s at Stanford University.
1. These calculations are computed from a second-order autoregression for the output
gap, using the formula for the mean cyclical period given in Taylor (1980): period = 2'TT/
cost-l ( - 0.5(1 - al + a2», where aj are the coeffi<;ients of the ith lags in the auto-
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he finds display much lower variance in the second period, and the
degree of serial correlation in the responses of the system to shocks,
which he finds increases.
Aparticularstrengthofthepaperis thatTaylorinterpretsthereduced-
form evidence gleaned from vector autoregressions (VARs) of de-
trended output and inflation in the light ofa simple structural model to
accountfor the stylizedfacts thatemerge. The transformation ofa mass
ofdatainto afew key parametersis very welcome. The model combines
"sticky" price setting (with prices unresponsive to contemporaneous
demand movements) witha reactionfunction for aggregate demand pol-
icy that implies that the monetary and fiscal authorities respond with
some degree ofaccommodation to output and inflation shocks.
The postwar results, as one might suspect, are quite consistent with
the interpretationoffered by Taylor's model. The well-known stickiness
of wages and prices, combined with partial demand accommodation,
leads to a cyclical response ofinflation, recession, and eventual return
to equilibrium in response to a price shock.
The pre-World War I results do not fit easily with such a model. The
shortness of output cycles in the data is consistent with the very low
degree of serial correlation of prices (lack of stickiness) in this time
period. But the fact that price shocks do notlead to outputfluctuations,
except contemporaneously, suggests full accommodation by the mon-
etaryauthority. This is the puzzleTaylorfaces us with, since we usually
think ofpolicy as being unaccommodative under a gold standard. The
resolutionofthepuzzleis obtainedby noting thatunderagold standard,
imported (but not domestic) price shocks would be accommodated by
gold inflows and hence would not necessarily be followed by adverse
fluctuations in real output.
Credence is given to this interpretation by adding the growth rate of
money to the VAR that Taylor estimates. When this is done, price
innovations not only are found to be positively correlated with money
shocks, but are also followed by subsequent accommodating monetary
movements.2 For the explanation to be convincing, however, it must
2. Exactly the opposite results holdfor the postwarperiodwhen it appears thatpositive
output shocks leave money unchanged (and arefollowed byvelocity increases), but price
shocks are followed by expansionary monetary growth. These observations, too, are in
accord with Taylor's conjectures. The actual equations (estimated for 1893-1914 and
1954-83, with m representing the growth rate ofM2 prewar and Ml postwar and t ratios
in parentheses) are:
Prewar: mt = .64Pt-l + .70Pt-2 - .52Yt-l - .33Yt-2 R2 = 0.51
(2.1) (2.4) (2.8) (1.8)
Postwar: mt = - .59pt-l + 1.25pt-2 + .25Yt-l + .02Yt-2 R2 = 0.66
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also be argued that the price shocks really did originate overseas. In
view of the desynchronization of the United States cycle from Euro-
pean fluctuations that Moore and Zarno\\'itz document for the prewar
period, this is by no means self-evident. More doubt arises because
Taylor is using a deflator for domestic prices to measure inflation, not
one that includes the prices of imports directly. It is true, of course,
that the rapid expansion of world gold production after 1896 is con-
sistent with the importation ofprice rises from abroad. Taylor's other
conjecture from looking at the output/inflation results is that output
shocks werefollowed byextinguishingmonetaryfluctuations. The VAR
mentioned above also confirms this supposition.
For whatever reasons, then, prewarpolicy does appear to have been
more accommodatingofprice shocks andl,ess accommodatingofoutput
shocks than it was in the postwar period. What does all this have to
do with the role of prices and wages in improving macroeconomic
stability? Despite the usefulness of Taylor's interpretive model and
reduced-form findings, we learn little about the really fundamental dif-
ference between the two time periods. Given that wages and prices do
appear stickier in the postwar period, is this increase in stickiness a
result of more accommodative demand policy followed since the 1946
Employment Act, or was the accommodative policy itself a reaction
to an increase in wage and price stickiness? The answerto this question
is absolutely crucial in learning from these two periods.
Many reasons have been advanced for "exogenous" reductions in
wage and price flexibility: increased concentration in industry, reduc-
tion in the role ofprimary industries and their replacement by service
industry, and increased unionization of the labor force. The growing
importance ofexplicit and implicit contracts is also cited by some. But
the increased willingness of the governm(~nt to accommodate fluctua-
tions, either by automatic stabilizers, by institutions such as deposit
insurance, or through discretionary policy, will also increase the in-
centive ofprivate agents to save on costly negotiations by writing long-
term contracts.
Since a problem in interpreting the appearance of high coefficients
on the lagged dependent variable in an inflation equation as due to
inertia is that they may be in part expectational, it might make sense
to estimate inflation equations for the two periods with lagged inflation
and anticipated nominal GNP growth (in excess of trend real GNP
growth) as explanatory variables. If the lagged dependent variable in
Taylor's inflation equation was capturing expectations of inflation ac-
The prewar and postwar contemporaneous correlation coefficients ofoutput and money
are .61 and .63 respectively, and the corresponding inflation and money correlations are
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commodation, then such an approach might remove the significance
of the lags of the dependent variable in the equation. Doing this for
the prewar and postwar samples yields an insignificant sum of coeffi-
cients on two lags of inflation of .42 (F(2,19) = 2.81) for the prewar
period, and a highly significant .67 (F(2,26) = 47.1) for the postwar.3
It seems, therefore, that this simple technique has not found evidence
that the increased importance of lags represents purely expectational
effects. Inertia still characterizes the postwar, more than the prewar,
data. Just as in Taylor's paper, however, there is some limited evidence
of stickiness in the prewar period at a two-year lag.
One must applaud Taylor's use ofthe pre-World War I sample. This
interesting period deserves study and provides an instructive compar-
isonwiththepostwarperiod. Atthe sametime, onerunstheriskoftreat-
ing the prewarperiodas thoughitwere the "normal" stateofaffairs and
contrasting it with the postwar era with its "exceptional" price sticki-
ness. A slightly broadercomparisonmight be made with some evidence
from an earlier period. David Hume, in his justlyfamous essay on money,
reports that in the last year ofLouis XIV (1715) in France, prices rose
by only one-third the amount by which money grew. Thatperformance
is comparable to postwar behavior in the United States. Perhaps, then,
the period that requires special explanation is not the recent quarter-
century but the twenty-four years that preceded World War I.
Taylor provides results for bothprice and wage inflation. To measure
wages, he uses hourly earnings in manufacturing, which may not reflect
economywide wages, especially in view of the hypothesized changes
in relative prices of tradable goods. In his empirical results, he con-
sistently finds lower coefficients on wages than on prices, especially
in the prewar sample. Because ofthis, the moving average results give
the appearance of a procyclical real wage before the war. Although
this may be true, the lower coefficients on nominal wages, and the
consequent cyclical pattern ofreal wages, may simply be due to mea-
surement error in the wage series and hence may be spurious.
A methodological problem with the empirical analysis is the weight
put on interpretation of moving average coefficients, whose statistical
significance is notgiven in the paper. The very weak "fit" ofthe prewar
inflation and output equations (for example, none ofthe coefficients in
3. The actual equations estimated for 1893-1914 and 1954-83 are:
Prewar: Pt = .12pt-1 + .30Pt-2 + .20E(PY)t R2 = .41
(0.6) (1.5) (1.6)
Postwar: Pt = 1.06Pt-1 - .39pt-2 + .27E(PY)t, R2 = .85
(7.0) (- 2.4) (2.5)
where a constant and two lagged values of inflation and growth of nominal output and
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the prewar wage/output system is individually significant at the .05
level) must be hiding some "true" stickiness from the observer. It
would certainly be surprising ifany ofthe moving average terms from
that system were significantly different from zero.
Another obstacle to interpreting the moving average coefficients is
Taylor's decision to ignore the contemporaneous correlation of the
innovations to the two equations, which in the systems he estimates
are always significantly different from zero (and positive). Although
there are, as he says, an infinite number ofpossible decompositions of
this correlation, his model specifically implies one. Since prices are
modeled as being unresponsive to contenlporaneous demand shocks,
it seems natural to allow price shocks (assuming they represent some-
thing more than pure measurement error) to enter the output gap equa-
tion contemporaneously. This might upsc~t the interpretation of the
output equation as a policy reaction function. In fact, it would lead to
a model with three equations-one for price adjustment, one for real
GNP, and a monetary policy rule. In any event, given the size of the
contemporaneous correlations involved, suc;h an orthogonalization may
well make quite a difference to the results.
In conclusion, John Taylor's paper has Inade a very useful and pro-
vocative contribution to the analysis of price/wage interaction in two
disparate periods of United States history. If there are still questions
to be answered about the roles ofwages and prices in the behavior of
the economy between the two periods, then this simply underscores
Taylor's concluding statement in the paper: that the policy implications
of understanding why the Phillips curve has become flatter with the
passage oftime are sufficient motivation for further study ofthe issues.
Comment J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers
In his contributions to this volume John Taylor reaches exactly the
opposite conclusion from that in our papl~r (chap. 12); he finds that
improved macroeconomic performance has taken place in spite ofrather
thanbecauseofthe increased rigidity ofwages and prices in thepostwar
period. Our explanation has the virtue of parsimony. We attribute the
major change in economic performance to the major change in eco-
nomic structure rather than telling a complt~x story involving offsetting
effects. Moreover, Taylor provides no explanation of the forces that
have accounted for the huge decline in thl~ variance of aggregate de-
mand shocks he claims took place. As we shall argue below, Taylor's
J. Bradford DeLong is a graduate student in the Department ofEconomics at Harvard
University. Lawrence H. Summers is professor of economics at Harvard University.670 John B. Taylor
theory that monetary policy has become less accommodative overtime
also seemsimplausible. Herests his conclusionsonbivariatetime series
analysis ofprices and output. We begin by showing that his conclusions
canbereproducedin a modelwhereincreasedpriceflexibility increases
macroeconomicinstabilityandthentumtootheraspectsofhis argument.
Begin with an aggregate demand curve similar to that in section 12.3
of our paper:
(1) qt+1 = ~I(mt - Pt) + ~2(EtPt+1 - Pt) + Et
and assume perfect foresight for investors:
(2) Etpt+1 = Pt+l·
Equation (1) contains qt+ I in order to make the timing come out right:
think of firms placing orders for investment goods this period, orders
that do not show up in output until next period.
For simplicity, specify a simpler aggregate supply equation than in
section 12.2;
(3) Pt+1 - Pt = Pt - Pt-I + aqt+l·
(5)
(6)
The inflation rate accelerates or decelerates depending on the output
gap. This aggregate supply equation is the simplest that both is "su-
perneutral" and exhibits "persistence."
To close the model, a money supply rule is needed. The simple
assumption of section 12.2, the assumption of no movement at all in
the money stock will not be a satisfactory underpinning for empirical
analysis. We assume:
(4) mt = (1 - A)Pt + APt-I.
The money stock accommodates to the price level partially within the
period and fully after two periods. A value of one for A would imply
no accommodation within the period; a value of zero would imply
complete accommodation within the period.
Denoting Pt - Pt-I by Pt, solving the model, produces:
. 1 - A~I • a
Pt = 1 (.l Pt-I + 1 (.l Et
- a~2 - a~2
~2 - A~I • 1
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If Et follows a white-noise process with unit variance, then solving
for the inverse ofthe variance of output leads to the equation:
J.. _ _ (~ !) (~~ ~1~2A) 2 (f~ - 1 2 132 + 2 131/\ (l + 2 + 2 (l •
Therefore further increases in the price flexibility parameter a are des-
tabilizing and increase the variance ofoutput, so long as
1 1
(10) a < - +---- .
2~2 ~2 + ~~lA
But (7) and (8) imply that a must satisfy (10). In this model, the variance
ofoutput is least when a equals zero, when there is no flexibility at all
in the aggregate price level.
And yet empirical analysis ofa system generated by (1) through (4)
would produce results that might mimic quite closely those Taylor
obtained for the postwar period. An economist who knew the timing
ofthe aggregate supply equation might be able to recover it exactly:
(11) Pt = Pt-l + aqt .
And an attempt to estimate a combined aggregate demand/monetary
reaction function equation would yield:
qt - qt-l (- ~131 - :2 - !) Pt-l
(12) - a 2 ICl
+ (A~l - ~2 1 - aA~l ) .
1
Q. + (1 Q.) Pt-2, - a...,2 a - a...,2
where A~l - ~2' 1 - a~2' and 1 - aA~b are all positive.
These coefficients are too large to be taken seriously. However, their
size (but not their sign) is clearly an artifact of the model. The coef-
ficients on Pt-l and Pt-2 are highly correlated, and the introduction of
a supply shock or of serial correlation in the demand shock would
quickly bring them down to more reasonable values-their large size
in (12) is due to the fact that the difference betweenpt_l andpt-2 carries




Pt = Pt-l + aqt
which bear a close resemblance to Taylor's (5) and (7):
(15)
(16)
Pt = .88pt-l + .25qt
qt - qt-l = - 1.03pt-l -1- •73pt-2·672 John B. Taylor
Therefore we conclude that Taylor's empirical findings are neither evi-
dence for nor evidence against the hypothesis that an increase in per-
sistence has led to an increase in stability. By assuming that the size
ofthe shocks is independent ofthe structure ofthe model, he can reach
one conclusion. By specifying a different underlying model-one that
stresses the role of variations in the real interest rate in producing
variations in output-the opposite conclusions emerge.!
Itis a strikingfeature ofTaylor's structuralanalysis that in explaining
the changes in cyclical patterns between the pre-World War I period
and the present one, he finds that all the structural parameters in his
model change. Particularly surprising are his conclusions about mon-
etary policy. He finds that it has become less accommodative under
the current fiat money regime than it was under the earlier gold stan-
dard. He attributes the looseness of short-run monetary policy under
the gold standard to the effects offoreign price shocks, which should
have led to specie inflows. There are at least two important flaws in
this argument. First, it is implausible that, at a time when imports
represented only about 6% of GNP, foreign price shocks were the
principal source ofinflation shocks, especially using the GNP deflator
to measure prices. Second, analyses of the gold standard surveyed in
Bordo and Schwartz (1984) have made it clear that short-run specie
flows in response to price shocks were negligible during the gold stan-
dard period. There thus seems to be little evidence for the monetary
policy assumptions necessary to drive Taylor's conclusions.
Reply John B. Taylor
In their comments on my paper DeLong and Summers introduce a
simple three-equation macromodel to argue theirmain point. Using this
model, they show that a decrease in price flexibility-that is, a reduc-
tion of the coefficient of demand in the price adjustment equation-
leads to a decrease in the variance ofreal output. They assert that this
model is roughly consistent with the empirical findings in my paper.
Therefore, they argue, my empirical findings support the view that a
decrease in price flexibility unambiguously decreases output variance,
contrary to my own stated views.
1. Taylor's finding that output is a decreasing function ofpast inflation is not evidence
that the positive effect-through the real interest rate-of inflation on output is small.
Taylor's negative coefficient is for an equation that is itself not structural, that is a
combinationofthe aggregatedemandequationand the"monetarypolicyreactionfunction.673 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
Upon closer inspection, however, the [nodel produced by DeLong
and Summers is grossly inconsistent with the empirical findings re-
ported in my paper. This inconsistency turns out to be crucial for the
question of price flexibility and output variability. The discrepancy
between the DeLong/Summers model and the dataoccurs in theirtreat-
ment of the stochastic disturbance terms in their equations. These
disturbance terms generate the movements in the model that underlie
their calculation of the output variance. Although they include a dis-
turbance term in the aggregate demand equation, they put no disturb-
ance terms in the price adjustment equation.
The empirical findings in my paper indi(=ate that disturbances to the
price adjustment equation constitute a significant part of the explana-
tion of output fluctuations. Ignoring these shocks could obviously be
misleading. Moreover, as I showed in a 1979 Econometrica paper, the
shocks to the price adjustment equation are what cause the trade-off
between output and inflation variance: attempts to stabilize inflation
sometimes require increased fluctuations in output, a factor that is
ignored throughout the Delong/Summers analysis but that I think is a
major factor in the business cycle.
What happens ifwe add a price shock to the DeLong/Summers price
adjustment equation? Suppose that the shock has a variance of 1, and
that the shock"to the aggregate demand equation has a variance of 4
(these numerical values correspond with the empirical findings in my
paper). Suppose also that the coefficient ~l equals 1, and the coefficient
~2 equals .1. Then for two choices of the policy parameter A the re-
sulting output variance depends of the coefficient 0: in the price ad-
justment equation in the following way:
Variance ofoutput (qt)











Adding a shock to the price adjustment equation changes the De-
Long/Summers results dramatically. Rath(~r than obtaining the mini-674 John B. Taylor
mum value ofthe outputvariance whenthe price adjustmentcoefficient
is zero, we see that the maximum value ofthe variance (00) is obtained.
The rationale is clear. When demand has no effect on inflation, there
is nothing available to stabilize inflation, and the inflation rate takes a
random walk with infinite variance. Since inflation appears in the ag-
gregate demand equation, output also has infinite variance. As we
increase the price adjustment parameter the variance of output de-
clines, contrary to the DeLong/Summers findings. Only for very large
values ofthe price adjustment term does the variance ofoutput begin
to increase again. But such large values are not empirically realistic.
The DeLong/Summers model-appropriately augmented to realisti-
cally take account of price shocks-therefore does support the view
stated in my paper that an increase in price flexibility would tend to
improve macroeconomic perrormance. In fact their model (with price
shocks) is much like the structural model reported and estimated in
my 1979 Econometrica paper, in which I computed trade-offs between
output and inflation fluctuations. In that paper the expected rate of
inflation appears in the aggregate demand equation (though with an
insignificant negative sign), so that the same possibilities for destabil-
izing price flexibility, which DeLong and Summers have emphasized,
exist in that model. As in this example, such a possibility does not
appear to be borne out empirically in the estimated version of that
model.
Some ofthe other criticisms of my analysis that DeLong and Sum-
mers raise are irrelevant, in my view. For example, they argue that my
explanation ofthe change in economic perrormance is too complicated,
involving offsetting effects. What is so complex? More stable aggregate
demand reduced economic fluctuations more than changes in wage-
and price-setting behavior increased them. Many people have inves-
tigated the reasons for the increased stability of aggregate demand.
That was not the subject of my paper, though I found the revisionist
analysis ofthese issues in the DeLong/Summers paper in this volume
fascinating reading. In general, however, how can one defend rejecting
a two-step argument that is correct in favor of a one-step argument
that is wrong?
DeLongand Summers also question the explanationsofmy empirical
finding that aggregate demand policy appears to be less accommodative
under the current fiat money regime than under the gold standard. As
the numerical example above shows, the degree ofaccommodation (as
measured by A) does not change the conclusion that decreased price
flexibility increases output variance over the relevant range ofparam-
eters. The result also holds for a wide range ofvalues ofAnot reported
above. In no way is this observed change in the response ofaggregate
demand policy to inflation "necessary to drive Taylor's conclusions,"675 Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability
as DeLong and Summers argue. I found my empirical result~ on ag-
gregate demand policy surprising and offered some possible explana-
tions, butthese results are unrelated to my view ofthe relation between
price flexibility and output variability.
Discussion Summary
Much of the initial discussion focused on the problems involved with
Taylor's structural interpretations ofhis \i'AR results. Martin N. Baily
commented that it seemed impossible to distinguish between aggregate
demand and aggregate supply shifts when the reduced- form equations
are used. Consequently it was unclear hov{ Taylor's "structure" could
be differentiated from a Lucas-type supply function in which price
flexibility leads to output fluctuations. Taylor's response was that the
dynamics embodied in his VAR results provide evidence for the ag-
gregate demand/supply structure rather than a Lucas supply function.
These dynamics show that positive price surprises are associated with
negative output movements and hence are identified with aggregate
supply shocks. Also, positive output surprises are found, over a longer
horizon, to be associated with positive price movements, which is
consistent with aggregate demand shocks .. Robert Hall remarked that
in the classic demand/supply curve estimation problem, Taylor's strat-
egy was equivalent to identifying every price rise with a shift in the
demand curve and every price decline with a shift in supply.
Blanchard questioned Taylor's use of a two-variable vector auto-
regression involving price and output. Since so much ofthe paper was
concerned with the accommodative polici(~s ofthe government, would
not a three-variable VAR including a poli,~y variable like money have
been preferable? Taylor replied that he had decided against using a
government policy variable for two reasons; first, the problems in find-
ing a satisfactory measure of policy-Ml, M2 unborrowed reserves,
or such-seemed difficult, and second, the goal of the paper was to
place structure on VAR results. This task is difficult enough in a two-
variable system. McCallum then noted that the structure Taylor em-
ployed essentially involved collapsing the monetary authority's price
rule into the aggregate demand curve to arrive at equation (7). Mc-
Callum thought that an undesirable feature of the resulting equation
was that it implied that the monetary authority could influence the
growth rate ofreal output through its choice ofthe inflation rate. Taylor
agreed with McCallum's interpretation but said he felt equation (7) was
justified by the data. In a world of sticky prices, in which the Fed676 John B. Taylor
targets nominal GNP growth, its policies can affect real output growth
directly.
The final point raised in the discussion was methodological and in-
volved Taylor's procedure for generating the moving average represen-
tations shown in tables 11.4-11.7 and figures 11.3 and 11.4. John Gew-
eke declared that VAR techniques can be used for two legitimate
purposes: to generate the response ofthe system to a shock in a partic-
ular variable, and to identify how the shocks in each variable feed back
from one anotheroversome time period (the "historicaldecomposition
ofthe series"). Bothofthese procedures require the researcherto spec-
ify how the covariance matrix of the shocks in the system is to be or-
thogonalized. In constructing his moving average representations Tay-
lor has deliberately avoided specifying such an orthogonalization. He
thus ignores the effectofthe correlations between the shocksofthe two
equations on the moving average coefficients. The moving average rep-
resentations Taylor presents are therefore "partial" in that they ignore
the channels for feedback from the other variable. Taylor agreed with
Geweke's statements but argued that for the purposes ofthis paper the
"partial" moving average representations facilitated a behavioral inter-
pretation of the results. Transforming the VAR estimates by a sample
covariance matrix wouldonly muddle the structuralinterpretationsthat
could be placed on the resulting moving average representations.
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